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Worker Dislocation: Who Bears The Burden? A
Comparative Study of Social Values in Five
Countries
Clyde W. Summers
A pervasive phenomenon in modern industrial societies is the
instability of employment. Production methods are replaced by
new processes requiring different skills; robots replace human
-hands; computers replace humaff competency. Demands for popu-
lar products shrink or disappear as new or substitute products
push into the market. Viable production facilities are transferred
to new owners who may have new workforces. Outmoded plants
are closed and new plants are opened, often at new locations with
new employees. Marginal enterprises are downsized and unprofit-
able enterprises are driven out of business. All of these changes
are accentuated by slumps in the business cycle, leaving workers
stranded without jobs.'
Dislocation of workers is inescapable in anything other than a
closed and regimented society which prefers stagnation to in-
creased living standards. Inventions and competition would create
irresistible pressures for rapid change even in a closed and self-
sufficient society, and such economic isolation does not exist in
today's world. Free trade and free movement of capital make con-
trol of these changes impossible. New shipyards in Japan forced
the closing of shipyards in Britain, Germany, and Sweden, and
Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 See generally SECRETARY OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND
WORKER DISLOCATION, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN A COMPET-
rrIVE SOCIETY (1986) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT]; BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT
HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNIY ABANDON-
MENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY (1982).
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were in turn closed after even newer shipyards were opened in
Taiwan. Modern steel mills in developing countries compelled
restructuring of the steel industry in developed countries. Auto
assembly plants moved from Michigan to the Mexican
maquliadoras, leaving lifetime auto workers without jobs. Textile
and garment manufacturing in Hong Kong and Singapore dis-
placed hundreds of thousands of workers in the United States and
Western Europe. All of this occurred before the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Instability of employment, often in the form of mass disloca-
tion, is a painful fact of our modern market economy, beyond the
reach of any country to prevent or even influence significantly.
Indeed, for a country to prosper it must embrace and accelerate
changes which introduce new products and increase production.
These changes, however, with their dislocation of workers, inevita-
bly bring substantial personal and social costs. The costs must be
borne either by the workers, the employer, or by society in gener-
al. How we distribute those costs implicitly expresses our social
values, and may in the long run affect our readiness and ability to
absorb those changes rather than to attempt to resist them.
My first purpose here is to compare how these costs and
burdens are distributed in five industrial societies in order to see
the variety of ways in which this problem is confronted. For this
purpose, I compare the distribution of burdens in the United
States with that in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and
Japan.
My second purpose is to identify and articulate the implicit
social values expressed by the way the costs or burdens are distrib-
uted. My goal is to sharpen our perception of how the United
States allocates these burdens in comparison with other countries
and to make us more aware of the social values implicit-but
seldom articulated or questioned-in our distribution of these
burdens.
I. WORKERS, EMPLOYERS, SOCIETY?
An analysis of how the burdens of worker dislocation are
distributed between workers, employees, and society must begin
with an examination of the legal rules and practices concerning
dismissal of employees, whether individual discharges or collective
terminations. In the United States we have two distinct labor mar-
kets governed by two quite different sets of rules: the individual
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labor market governed by the common law, and the collective
labor market governed by collective agreements. Collective agree-
ments currently cover less than fifteen percent of private sector
employees.2 More than eighty-five percent of private sector work-
ers have no union and are not protected by collective agreement;
thus, they are subject to common law labor rules.
The basic common law rule in the United States is a relic of
the nineteenth century: All employment is at will unless a specific
contractual provision provides to the contrary.3 Except for occa-
sional managerial and professional employees, there is seldom
such a contract; all others are employees at will. Employment at
will means exactly that. An employee may be dismissed at any time
for any reason, or for no reason. The courts have developed three
exceptions to this rule which give individual employees limited
protection. First, contractual protection may be found in employee
handbooks provided by employers,4 but this protection may be
undercut by provisions disclaiming that the handbook is intended
to create any contract rights.5 The second exception involves dis-
charges that violate public policy. Such discharges may make the
employer liable in tort, but courts generally recognize liability
based only upon public policies enacted by legislative bodies.'
Finally, a few states hold that discharge without cause of employ-
ees with many years of service may violate the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. However, this covenant is not gen-
erally recognized.' These three exceptions apply only in cases of
2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
UNITED STATES 1994, at 439 (114th ed. 1994). Only 11% of private sector agricultural
workers are union members. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT (1994).
3 Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule. 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118 (1976); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for
a Statute. 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
4 HOwARD A. SPECTER & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, INDIVqDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
LITIGATION 90-124 (1989) [hereinafter SPECTER & FINKIN]; Clare Tully, Note, Challenging
the Employment-at-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theoy, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 449
(1983).
5 Michael J. Phillips, Disclaimers of Wrongful Discharge Liability: Time for a Crackdown?,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1131 (1992); SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 4, at 125-28.
6 Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Excep-
tion, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 4, at 579-600.
7 Henry H. Penit, Jr., Implied Covenant: Anachronism or Augur, 20 SETON HALL L.
REV. 683 (1990); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note
4, at 601-06.
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individual dismissals; they have never been applied in cases of
collective dismissals.
Employment at will in the United States also allows dismissal
without notice or severance pay. An employer may give any or all
of its employees the "weekend farewell," notifying them on Friday
that they are terminated as of the end of the day. One depart-
ment store simply posted a notice on its locked doors on Monday
that the store was being sold to another company and all employ-
ees were terminated. The management of a college called mem-
bers of its staff to a meeting in an auditorium, told them they
were immediately dismissed, and prohibited them from going back
to their workplaces. Another more ingenious employer that had
decided to close its plant sounded a fire alarm and, when all of its
employees were out, locked the gates and announced that all
employees were terminated. A small dent has been made in this
practice of closing a plant or operation without notice by the
Workers Adjustment Retraining Notification Acte (WARN) passed
in 1988. WARN provides that employers of 100 or more employees
must give sixty days notice of a closing that will result in a layoff
of one-third of the workforce or of fifty or more employees.
WARN does not, however, require severance pay, and a number of
exceptions substantially limit the statute's application. In addition,
the employer's liability is limited to back pay for the required
notice period and a civil penalty of $500 per day. WARN has had
only spotty observation and enforcement to date.'
In simplest terms, eighty-five percent of private sector employ-
ees have only fragmentary protection from arbitrary individual
dismissal and essentially no protection from collective dismissals.
In cases of plant closings or mass dismissals, employees seldom
have a right to notice and have no right to severance pay. The
employer bears none of the burden of mass dislocation; instead,
the burden is placed entirely on the employees.
That burden is transferred in part to public funds through
state unemployment compensation systems; on the average, howev-
er, employees recover only thirty-five to forty percent of their back
wages." The payments continue for only six months, except in
areas of high unemployment where payments may be extended to
one year." The unemployment compensation funds are support-
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
9 Straddling The Law on Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, § 3, at 37.
10 ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, supra note 1, app. A at 4.
11 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS
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ed by payroll taxes, and since the .tax varies in many states with
experience ratings, dismissals may increase an employer's tax in
future years. But in cases of plant closings there may be no future
years, and when a mass dismissal occurs, the maximum tax rate
may still leave most or all of the burden on the state fund sup-
ported by taxes on other employers. The net effect is that the pre-
dominate weight of the financial burden falls on the dislocated
worker, with most of the rest borne by society through social pay-
ments. The employers who are actually responsible for the burden
bear little responsibility.
Workers covered by collective agreements have little more
protection against mass dismissals. Almost all collective agreements
include provisions prohibiting discharge without "just cause," with
the determination of whether just cause existed ultimately deter-
mined by an arbitrator. The remedy is customarily reinstatement
with back pay.2 Just cause clauses, however, protect only against
arbitrary individual discharges. They provide no protection against
collective layoffs or dismissals for economic reasons. Few collective
agreements require employers to give notice of layoff or collective
dismissal of longer than three days, and almost none requires
notice of more than fifteen days."3 Only forty percent of collec-
tive agreements provide for severance pay, and the amount of
such pay seldom exceeds one week for each year of service and is
commonly limited to eight weeks pay.,4
In cases of plant closings or technological changes that result
in mass layoffs or dismissals, the employer is not legally required
to notify or consult with the union. 5 In the words of the Su-
preme Court, these decisions "go to the core of entrepreneurial
control,"6 and management can ignore the interests of the em-
ployees dislocated in such cases. If the enterprise is transferred to
another employer, the employees have no right to continued em-
ployment, for the successor has no obligations under the collective
agreement. The successor may simply refuse to hire any or all of
(1991); SAUL J. BLAUSTEIN, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
12 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOT. & CONT. (BNA) 40:1 (1992).
13 Id. at 60:181.
14 Id. at 53:2.
15 First Nat'i Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679-86 (1981); Stephen D.
Ake, Evolving Concepts in Management Prerogatives: Plant Closures, Relocations and Mass Layoffs,
24 STETSON L REv. 241, 252-53 (1994).
16 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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the old employees and may replace them with an entirely new
workforce, even though the operations of the enterprise remain
unchanged.7
Seniority provisions give the employees as a group no protec-
tion against dislocation. They require that reductions in the
workforce be made according to seniority, but they serve only to
identify who shall work in the remaining jobs. They provide job
security to the senior employees at the expense of the junior em-
ployees. These provisions place no limits on the employer's free-
dom to determine how many shall work and to terminate those
not wanted.
Seniority provisions may fail to preserve even the remaining
jobs within the enterprise for the senior employees. Seniority gives
employees a right only to jobs within their seniority units, and an
enterprise may have several separate seniority units. When one
plant closes, an employee may have no claim to a vacancy in an-
other plant of the same employer because seniority is commonly
limited to single plants. Even departments in the same plant may
be separate seniority units so that employees may be dismissed
from one department while others are being hired off the street.
to fill vacancies in another."
Collective agreements can, of course, provide employees great-
er protection against dislocation. For example, collective agree-
ments in the automobile industry provide guarantees of employ-
ment to present employees, require the employers to transfer
dismissed workers to other plants, and to provide training or make
other provisions for dismissed employees."l Most employers, how-
ever, refuse to include such provisions in collective agreements.
Provisions could also be included to require an employer, on
transferring the business, to obligate the successor to assume the
collective agreement; this, however, is rarely done.
The end result is that under most collective agreements, the
employer's burden is little more than it would be if no collective
17 Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262-64
(1974). See generally B. Glenn George, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 277 (1988); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 761-850 (Patrick Hardin ed.,
3d ed. 1992).
18 CoLLEcIVE BARGAINING NEGoT. & CoNT. (BNA) 75:11 (1992).
19 Richard N. Block, The Legal and Institutional Framework for Employment Security in the
United States: An Overview, in EMPLOYMENr SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY: AN




agreement was in effect. The employer need not make an effort
to mitigate or avoid dislocation. It is free to decide how many
employees to dismiss and when. The employer is free to deter-
mine how much notice or severance pay it will give. It can move
operators to other locations, free of seniority obligations, and
terminate employees at an old location with no obligation to offer
available jobs at the new, location, to the dislocated employees. It
can sell the plant, and neither the employer nor its successor has
any obligation to avoid -dislocation by keeping employees in their
jobs.
The way burdens of dislocation due to industrial change are
distributed in the United States can be summarized in simple
terms. Whether under employment at will or under most collective
agreements, the employer bears little burden either in financial
costs or freedom of operation. Except for the possible increase in
its unemployment tax rate, the employer can be indifferent to the
consequences of its actions on its employees. The major burden is
borne by the dislocated -workers in their loss of jobs and loss of
income. Their financial loss is mitigated only in minor part by
societal support through unemployment compensation, which
amounts only to forty percent of a dismissed employee's lost wages
for a six month period.
A. United Kingdo? 0
The British system of job security fundamentally differs from
the American system. First, the British system has repudiated the
common law ' doctrine of 'employment at will; all employees are
now statutorily protected from unfair dismissal by the Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978. Any individual who is
dismissed may appeal to an industrial tribunal on grounds of sub-
stantive or procedural unfairness. The broad standard of "fairness"
requires only that the employer act reasonably in determining
whether sufficient grounds for dismissal exist. This is "determined
in accordance with equity and [the] substantial merits of the
case.""' Unlike arbitrators in the United States, the industrial tri-
20 See generally BOB HEPPLE & SANDRA FREDMAN, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL REIA-
TIONS IN GREAT BITAIN 144-78 (1992).
21 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, § 57(3) (Eng.). See generally
STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, LABOUR LAW: MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AND WORKERS' RIGHTS 117-
32 "(1992)" [hereinafter ANDERMAN, LABOUR LAW]; STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, THE LAW OF UN-
FAIR DISMISSAL (2d ed. 1985).
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bunal does not determine whether the employee's conduct pro-
vided just cause for the dismissal. Indeed, the tribunal does not
determine whether the employee in fact engaged in misconduct.
Instead, the tribunal determines only whether the employer rea-
sonably believed that the employee engaged in misconduct, and
whether the employer's resultant action was procedurally and sub-
stantially "within the range of reasonable' responses" or within the
"band of reasonableness."' Although the statute provides for re-
instatement, it is ordered in less than one percent of the cases,
and the median monetary award is equivalent to about eight weeks
of pay for the average manual worker.23
The Act prohibiting unfair dismissal provides no protection
from layoffs or terminations for economic reasons. The statute
allows dismissal in cases of "commercial necessity" or for "sound
business reasons," and the tribunal is not permitted to examine
the subjective business discretion of the employer. In the words of
the Employment Appeals Tribunal, "there could not and cannot
be any investigation into the rights and wrongs of the declared
redundancy."24
The second significant difference from the American system is
that British employers have various statutory obligations to give
advance notice of dismissal. Whether dismissed for personal or
economic reasons, employees not covered by a collective agree-
ment must be given advance notice. This notice requirement rang-
es from one week for those employed for one month or more to
twelve weeks for those who have been employed for twelve years
or more.' In addition, the employer must give those being dis-
missed two days off with pay to look for other work.26 Collective
dismissals require additional advance notice. European Community
Directive No. 75/129 on Collective Redundancies, implemented
22 Bob Hepple, Great Britain, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, LAW AND PRACTICE at 161,
166 (Roger Blanpain & Tadashi Hanani eds., 1994) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT SECUrIY].
23 Linda Dickens, Comparative Systems of Unjust Dismissal: The British Cas in ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. So., Nov. 1994, at 43, 49.
24 Brian Bercusson, Employment Protection and Labor Relations: The Regulatory Model of
Job Security in the United Kingdom, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR:
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES AND INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 305, 310 (Christoph F.
Buechtemann ed., 1993) [hereinafter LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR] (quoting Moon v.
Homeworthy Furniture (Northern) Ltd., [1977] I.R.L.R 117 (Empl. Appeal Trib.)).
25 Employment Protection Act, 1975, § 49 (Eng.).
26 Id. § 31.
27 See Roger Blanpain & Chris Engels, The Eurpean Communities, in EMPLOYMENT
SEcuRrry, supra note 22, at 43, 43.
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by the Employment Protection Act of 1975,2" requires that the
employees' representative be notified thirty to ninety days in ad-
vance of the decision to make a collective dismissal, and that the
Department of Employment be notified thirty days in advance of
such planned dismissal. The notice period thus is extended poten-
tially to 114 days. Since the employer is required to provide con-
tinued employment during the notice period, the employee has
substantial time to seek another job.
The third significant difference from the American system is
that under Directive No. 75/129, the British employer is required
to consult with the employees' representative before making deci-
sions on collective dismissals. The employer must inform the
employees' representative of the reasons for the projected dismiss-
al, the number and categories of workers to be dismissed, the
period over which the dismissal will be made, and the criteria for
selecting the workers to be dismissed. The employer must do
more than simply give the employees' representative an opportuni-
ty to comment; it must "consult with the workers' representatives
with a view to reaching an agreement" -- a very strong form of
consultation which approaches the duty to bargain in good faith.
This duty to consult with the union has added significance be-
cause the Industrial Code of Practice places an obligation on the
employer to offer employees other suitable employment, stop re-
cruiting, reduce overtime, and retire employees entitled to pen-
sions50
The fourth difference from the American system is that in
cases of collective dismissals that come within the definition of
redundancies, the British employer is obligated to make redundan-
cy or severance payments to the dismissed employees. These lump
sum payments are scaled on the basis of age, length of service,
and earnings. The payments range from one week to thirty weeks,
with a weekly maximum of 205 pounds and a cumulative total of
28 Now Trade Union and Labor Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, §§ 188-198
(Eng.).
29 Blanpain & Engels, supra note 27, at 45-46. The requirement, however, "has been
defined rather weakly" in Great Britain. S. D. Anderman, The United Kingdom, in 15 BUL-
LETIN OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR RELATIONS: RESTRUCTURING LABOUR IN THE ENTERPRISE
121, 125 (R. Blanpain ed., 1986) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING].
30 See generally Bercusson, supra note 24, at 311. For the legal affect of this code, see
Employment Protection Act, 1975, sched. 17, 1 4(1) (Eng.); ANDERMAN, LABOUR LAW,
supra note 21, at 157-58, 163.
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6,150 pounds.3' Unions frequently negotiate for amounts above
the minimum, and employers may offer individual employees
more to encourage them to elect voluntary redundancy. When
redundancy payments were introduced in 1965, the government
rebated to the employer one-half of the redundancy paid. Present-
ly, however, the entire cost is borne by the employer. 2
The fifth difference from the American system is that British
employers are also bound by the European Community Directive
on Transfer of Undertakings, Directive No. 77/187.1' This Direc-
tive ensures that the contract of employment and employment
itself continue unchanged when a going enterprise is transferred.
The individual contract of employment binds the successor em-
ployer to the extent that the employer can neither dismiss nor re-
place employees nor change the terms and conditions of their
employment solely because of the transfer. Employees can be
dismissed only for economic, technical, or organizational reasons
resulting from changes in the workplace. The successor must also
continue to observe the terms and conditions of employment on
the same terms applicable to the transferor. Both the transferor
and the transferee must inform the employees' representative of
the reason for the transfer, its legal, economic, and social implica-
tions for the employees, and the measures envisaged for the em-
ployees. The transferor and transferee must consult in good time
with the employees' representative on any measures relating to the
employees with a view to seeking an agreement.
This Directive applies to transfers in any form, whether by
sale of assets, sale of shares, or otherwise, so long as there is sub-
stantial continuation of the business activity and a retention of its
functional identity. The satisfaction of these conditions is deter-
mined not by legal formalities, but by consideration of all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction.'
In Britain, dismissed employees are entitled to unemployment
compensation which consists of a flat rate plus an earnings-related
supplement, which together represent about sixty percent of aver-
age annual wage. The employer's tax is not experience rated as in
the United States, so the dismissal adds no burden to the respon-
sible employer.
31 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, sched. 4 (Eng.).
32 HEPPLE & FREDMAN, supra note 20, at 176.
33 See generally Blanpain & Engels, supra note 27, at 43.
34 The specific British legal rules implementing the Directive are elaborated upon in
ANDERMAN, LABOUR LAW, supra note 21, at 165-70.
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It is evident that in Britain, in contrast to the United States,
an employer responsible for a mass dislocation of workers bears a
significant portion of the burden associated with that dislocation.
Notice periods require the employer to continue employment for
a substantial period up to nearly four months. The employer must
negotiate with the employees' representative not only to reduce
the number and impact of the dismissal by reducing overtime, but
also to reduce the number dismissed and to find other suitable
jobs in the enterprise. In addition, the employer is required to
bear the substantial burden of severance pay.
At the same time, the shock and burden of dislocation on the
workers is significantly less in Great Britain than in the United
States. Employees are guaranteed a period of notice of up to six-
teen weeks so that they may seek other work, start a business, or
make other adjustments. Their severance award may amount to as
much as thirty weeks' pay. Like American workers, British workers
will receive unemployment compensation, but in a somewhat larg-
er amount, and for ten months instead of six.
In short, in Britain, the burden of dislocation falls much
more heavily on the employer and much less heavily on the dis-
missed worker. The burden on social funds through unemploy-
ment compensation is somewhat heavier because of the larger
benefits.
B. Germany5
Job security in Germany, as in the United Kingdom, is provid-
ed by law, and unlike in the United States is not dependent on
the collective agreement. Additional protections may be provided
by the collective agreement, but these are not of major impor-
tance.
The German dismissal statute declares dismissals which are
"socially unjustified" legally void. 6 The underlying premise of the
statute, as contrasted with the American doctrine of employment
at will, is that an employee has a right to continued
employment." It can be terminated only upon the employer's
35 See generally MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 80-93 (1987); Werner Sengenberger, Federal Republic of Germa-
ny, in WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS IN UNDERTAKINGS 79-105 (Edward Yemin ed., 1982) [here-
inafter WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS].
36 Protection Against Dismissal Act (Kfindigungsshutzgesetz), § 1 (F.R.G.). See general-
ly EUGEN STAHLHACKE, KONDIGUNG UND KfINDIGUNGSSCHUTZ IM ARBErrSVERHALTNIS (1982).
37 Manfred Weiss, Individual Employment Rights: Focusing on Job Security in the Federal
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showing of "social justification." This premise, which views job
security as a legal right, shapes the legal and social response to
worker dislocation.
The requirement of "social justification" applies equally to
individual dismissals for personal reasons and collective dismissals
for economic reasons. Social justification for individual discharges
roughly parallels "just cause" under American collective agree-
ments, with the burden on the employer to show justification.'
Disputes as to justification are resolved by the labor courts. These
courts give somewhat less protection than American arbitrators,
and discharged employees seldom seek or are awarded reinstate-
mentY9 However, because the employer must consult with the
works council (the employees' elected representatives in the plant)
before dismissal, the effective protection is much the same because
the employer is much less likely to dismiss an employee when it
knows in advance that the union will object."
Collective dismissals for economic reasons must also be social-
ly justified; the employer must prove the details of the economic
situation and the necessity for reducing the workforce. In practice,
however, this does not significantly limit the employer's freedom
to restructure the enterprise, relocate or close plants, or reduce
the number of employees, for the labor courts will not second-
guess the employer's economic decision so long as it appears to
be made in good faith." There are, however, two important limi-
tations.
First, the employer, in selecting which employees are to be
dismissed must take "social aspects" into account. These include
age, length of employment, marital status, family responsibilities,
ability to find other work, and other factors in the social situation.
In general, the principle is that those who would suffer most from
dismissal should be the last to go; the focus is on the social justice
to the individual.42
Republic of Germany, 67 NEB. L. REV. 82, 86 (1988).
38 Rolf Birk, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal in West Germany: Historical Evolution and
Legal Regulation, in LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 247, 249-50.
39 Weiss, supra note 37, at 98.
40 Id. at 95-96.
41 Manfred Weiss, Germany, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, supra note 22, at 141, 146;
Birk, supra note 38, at 250.
42 Birk, supra note 38, at 264; Weiss, supra note 37, at 86-89. In practice, the em-
ployer gives substantial weight in selection to the suitability of the employee, absenteeism,
or productivity so the collective dismissals have an element of individual discipline and
performance. See Gerhard Bosch, West Germany, in MANAGING WORKFORCE REDUCTION: AN
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Second, and most important, a dismissal is socially unjustified
if another job is available in the enterprise, even in another loca-
tion, which the employee can fill with reasonable schooling or
training provided by the employer. If a plant or operation is
moved to a new location, the employees are entitled to move with
the work.43
Third, dismissals, though socially justified, may be void if the
employer fails to give the required notices. In all dismissals, wheth-
er individual or collective, the employer must first consult with the
works council. The employer must inform the works council of
who is to be dismissed, the reason for the dismissal and the date,
and all other information needed by the works council to deter-
mine the appropriateness of the employer's action.' If the works
council declares a reservation or objects, which it does in only
fourteen percent of the cases, the employer can still dismiss. In
many such cases, however, the works council's action will lead the
employer to withdraw the dismissal.4'
After the works council has been consulted, each individual to
be dismissed must be given written notice. The minimum notice
period is four weeks for all employees who have passed the proba-
tion period of six months, and ranges from two months for em-
ployees with six years of service to eight months for those with
twenty years of service.' In cases of misconduct, or where there
are other urgent reasons, including severe economic circumstances
which make it intolerable to continue the employment relation,
employees may be dismissed without notice.4 7
In cases of collective dismissals in firms of more than twenty
employees, after consulting with the works council, the employer
must notify the State Labor Exchange at least thirty days before
the dismissals take effect. The Labor Exchange has the power to
delay the dismissals for up to two months, but may order short
time work during that period to reduce the burden on the em-
ployers.'
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 164, 171-72 (Michael Cross ed., 1985) [hereinafter MANAGING
WORKFORCE REDUCTION].
43 Weiss, supra note 41, at 146.
44 Weiss, supra note 37, at 89.
45 Id.
46 Harmonization of Notice Periods, EUR. INDUS. REL. REv., Feb. 1994, at 22.
47 Weiss, supra note 41, at 145-46.
48 1. at 148-49.
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The unique and significant instrument in the German system
for dealing with worker dislocation is the "social plan." 9 If an
employer with twenty or more employees plans a change which
will materially disadvantage a substantial portion of the workforce,
such as restructuring jobs, introducing new production processes,
closing part or all of a plant, or transferring operations, the works
council must be informed "in full and good time."" The employ-
er and works council are to work out a "compromise of interests"
for accomplishing the change; if they are unable to reach an
agreement, the works council can enforce a "social plan" by sub-
mitting the dispute to an arbitration committee for a binding deci-
sion."'
The social plan can cover all aspects of adjusting the
workforce: timing and stages of the change; transferring employees
to other work or locations, including retraining and moving or
travel expenses; supplementing reduced earnings; providing early
retirement for older workers; identifying surplus workers to be
dismissed; and assisting employees in finding jobs in other compa-
nies within the concern or in unrelated companies.
The most important part of the social plan is determining
severance pay for each worker who is to be dismissed. Severance
pay is generally based on length of service, age, and rate of pay.
The works council also considers the financial resources of the
employer. In a financially healthy enterprise, severance pay may be
equivalent to one year's pay for an older employee with fifteen
years service or one month's pay for a younger employee with two
years of service. In a financially weak enterprise, the severance pay
may be less than half that amount, since one consideration in
determining severance pay is what amount the employer can af-
ford to pay and still continue operations.52
49 See generally Bosch, supra note 42, at 179-84; Weiss, supra note 41, at 152-53; PETER
VON OCHS, ANALYSE BETRIEBLICHER SOZIALPLANE (1976); ALOYS VOGT, SOZIALPLANE IN DER
BETRIEBLICHEN PRAXIS (1981).
50 This depends on the size of the employer and the number of employees to be
dismissed. For example, in order for the works council to enforce a social plan, an em-
ployer with 20 to 60 employees must dismiss 20% of those employees with the minimum
number of dismissals set at 6. An employer with more than 500 employees must dismiss
10% with a minimum of at least 60. Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsges), §
111 (F.R.G.).
51 Id. § 112.
52 PETER VON OCHS, supra note 49, at 105, 127-37; KATHERINE C. ABRAHAM & SUSAN
N. HOUSEMAN, JOB SECURITY IN AMERICA, LESSONS FROM GERMANY 21-22 (1993); M. Weiss,
F.R. of Gernany, in RESTRUCTURING, supra note 29, at 25, 34-35.
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Employer poverty, however, does not excuse the obligation to
develop a social plan and pay severance pay. The arbitration deci-
sions reflect a strong social sense that employees should receive
some compensation, however meager, for dislocation from their
job." There is also an accepted view that an enterprise unable to
pay such compensation will not long survive in any case, and the
employees have a claim to share in the assets.
In Germany, as in the United Kingdom, employees are pro-
tected if the enterprise is transferred, for the Directive on Trans-
fer of Undertakings is equally applicable. The employer must in-
form and consult with the works council prior to the transfer, and
individual employment rights and collective bargaining agreements
continue unbroken. The length of service used in measuring the
right to notice or severance pay includes the combined employ-
ment both before and after the transfer.
Unemployment compensation for dismissed workers is substan-
tially better in Germany than in either the United States or the
United Kingdom. Benefits are normally sixty-eight percent of net
pay for a one year period.54 However, those over fifty years of age
can draw benefits for twenty-six months and those over age fifty-
four for thirty-two months.5 Thus, employees who have not yet
reached fifty-eight and are dismissed can collect unemployment
compensation until sixty and then take early retirement with full
benefits. Retirement benefits until the normal retirement age of
sixty-three must be paid by the employer.56 The unemployment
compensation is paid from a fund provided by equal contributions
from employers and employees and is not experience rated.
The German system, based on the premise that an employee
has a right to continued employment, provides employees substan-
tially greater protection against dislocation than the system in the
United Kingdom. Notice of dismissal gives the employee more
than double the time to seek other work or start a business. The
Labor Court will inquire into the justification for economic dis-
missals and will require, in particular, that the dismissed employ-
53 Even bankruptcy will not prevent responsibility for developing a social plan. See
generally VOLKMAR GESSNER & KONSTANZE PLETr, DER SOZIALPLANE IM KONKURS-
UNTERNEHMEN (1982).
54 ABRAHAM & HOUSEMAN, supra note 52, at 24.
55 Id. at 27; Early Retirement: An International Comparison, EUR. INDUS. REL REv., Dec.
1985, at 20 (1985).
56 Bernard Casey, Redundancy and Early Retirement: The Interaction of Public and Private
Policy in Britain, Germany and the USA, 30 BRrr. J. INDUS. REL 425, 435 (1992).
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ees be offered available jobs in the enterprise and that they re-
ceive some education and training to qualify for these jobs. Social
plans give dislocated employees significant benefits in getting relo-
cated to other jobs and also provide severance pay substantially
greater than redundancy payments in Britain.
All of these benefits reduce the burden of dislocation on the
employees and shift it to the employers. The employers' freedom
of action is significantly circumscribed: the ability to close down
operations is delayed by requirements of notice, the Labor Ex-
change can postpone action for two months, and the employer is
required to consult with the works council. The employer must
transfer and train employees for available jobs in the enterprise
and, under a social plan, may be required to help employees get
relocated in other enterprises. In addition, the employer may have
heavy financial obligations for severance pay.
In short, substantially more of the burden of dislocation is
shifted from the employees to the employer in Germany than in
Britain. Also, because the benefits in Germany are more than
double those in Britain, unemployment compensation shifts more
of the burden from the employees to social funds.
C. Swede
5 7
Until 1974, Swedish workers had no legally protected job
security-employment was at will. Although almost all workers
were covered by collective agreements, until the 1960s few agree-
ments included protections against dismissal; the Swedish
Employers' Federation insisted that all agreements by its members
provide that "the employer is entitled to direct and distribute the
work, to hire and dismiss workers at will and to employ workers
whether organized or not." This historical pattern was turned
upside down by legislation in the 1970s.'
The Employment Security Act of 1974 was based on the policy
that the employer has a social responsibility for employees and
that employees have a certain right to continued employment.59
It provides that all dismissals, both individual and collective, must
be based on "objective cause." These words, as applied by the
57 See generally Axel Adlercreutz. Sweden, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR
LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Roger Blanpain ed., 1990) [hereinafter INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCCLOPAEDIA].
58 Summers, supra note 3, at 515-17.
59 Adlercreutz, supra note 57, at 112.
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Labor Court, give individual employees who are dismissed for
personal reasons somewhat greater protection than that given by
arbitrators under "just cause" clauses in American collective agree-
ments.6
Shortage of work counts as an "objective cause," and the La-
bor Court's inquiry is limited to whether there really is a shortage
or merely a pretext. The employer, however, retains control over
the business decisions of the number of employees needed and
with what qualifications.61
An employee cannot be dismissed for lack of work if the
employer has other available work for which the employee is quali-
fied. The employer must investigate whether a transfer is possible
and make its best effort to find a suitable job, including some
restructuring of the job duties to fit the employee's ability.62 The
employer is required to train the transferred employee, but only
to the extent it would train a newly hired employee. However,
government subsidies are available for employers who provide in-
plant training for available work.6'
An employee can be dismissed only after notice, except in
cases of very serious misconduct where no other solution is avail-
able. The minimum notice period for dismissal is one month,
which increases according to the age of the employee, not the
length of service. For instance, a twenty-five year old employee is
entitled to two months' notice, while a forty-five year old employee
is entitled to six months' notice.' The purpose of notice is to
give an employee time to find other work or to visit the unem-
ployment exchange. During this period, the employee is entitled
to time off with pay.'
Before giving an employee notice of dismissal, the employer
must inform the union. The minimum period of forewarning in
cases of collective dismissal for lack of work is one month. Addi-
tionally, under the Codetermination Act of 1976, the employer
must negotiate with the union concerning alternatives to dismissal
and, if dismissal is granted, how it will be scheduled. These negoti-
ations may take more than a month because they may be moved
60 Id. at 113-14. See genrally LARs LUNNING, ANSTALLNINGSSKYDD (1984).
61 Adlercreutz, supra note 57, at 113-14.
62 A. Victorin, Sweden, in RESTRUCTURING, supra note 29, at 85, 90.
63 Id. at 91.
64 Employment Protection Act, § 11 (Swed.).
65 Id. § 14.
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from the local union level to the national level. If no agreement is
reached during these negotiations, the employer can implement its
decision.6
In addition, the employer must notify the County Employ-
ment Board either when negotiations with the union begin or,
depending on the number of employees to be affected, two to six
months in advance. The purpose of this notice is to enable the
Board to make plans for placement or training and for other
measures to relocate the dismissed employees. It has the effect of
requiring the employer to continue employment and give the
employees added time to make adjustments.
7
When there is a shortage of work, dismissals are determined
by the seniority of employees covered by the collective agreement.
Seniority also governs the right to be recalled for available work
during the year after dismissal.' This statutory rule may be modi-
fied by agreement between the union and the employer. In many
cases, the union agrees that senior workers nearing retirement age
may be dismissed first, reasoning that those workers will receive
unemployment compensation until they are entitled to a pension
and, therefore, suffer less than younger employees. 9
Dismissed employees obtain a wide range of government sup-
port to reduce the consequences of dislocation-generous unem-
ployment compensation is but the beginning. Unemployment
benefits amount to about eighty percent of net pay and are pay-
able for 300 days. Employees over fifty-five, however, are entitled
to benefits for 450 days, 0 with early retirement available at age
sixty. As a result, those who are dismissed after age fifty-eight suf-
fer no break in social payments.
In addition, the government has numerous programs designed
to reestablish the unemployed in the labor market." Benefits may
66 Id. § 29; Victorin, supra note 62, at 90, 95-99.
67 Employment Protection Act § 30 (Swed.); Victorin, supra note 62, at 100.
68 Employment Protection Act §§ 22-29 (Swed.); Victorin, supra note 62, at 92-95.
69 Lena Gonhs, Labor Market Adjustments to Structural Change in Sweden, in LABOR MAR-
KET ADJUSTMENTS TO STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 180, 183
(Eileen Appelbaum & Ronald Schettkat eds., 1990).
70 ANDERS BJoRKLUND ET AL., LABOUR MARKET POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
112-13 (1991); Unemployment Insurance Reform Bill EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Nov. 1993, at 11.
71 See generally G6sta Rehn, Swedish Active Labor Market Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, 24
INDUS. REL. 62 (1985); HELEN GINSBURG, FULL EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE
UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN 127-55 (1983); Gregory Hooks, The Policy Response to Factny
Closings: A Comparison of United States, Sweden, and France, in ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCL, Sept. 1984, at 110.
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be available for unemployed persons to start businesses of their
own, the benefits being treated as a substitute for unemployment
benefits. Anyone willing to move to an area where jobs are avail-
able may obtain a traveling allowance, moving expenses for the
family, and a guarantee of housing. The government also operates
an extensive retraining program which is available to the unem-
ployed. During the training period, the person receives a stipend
corresponding to the unemployment compensation benefit, but
the stipend may be extended after the benefits would have ex-
pired. Those seeking work are aided by a comprehensive nation-
wide job placement service, with which employers are required to
register all vacancies; these vacancies are then made available to
the unemployed on computerized lists.
"Relief work," which is commonly work in hospitals or local
government operations, serves as a safety net.' The work is gen-
erally available to those whose unemployment benefits have ex-
pired. Relief workers customarily work half-time and are paid regu-
lar hourly rates. The importance of retraining and relief work is
that often as many workers are enrolled in these two programs
combined as are collecting regular unemployment compensation.
The most unique feature of the Swedish system in dealing
with the problem of worker dislocation is what can only be de-
scribed as nongovernmental social funds. If employees are tempo-
rarily laid off, the employer must continue to pay full wages. The
employer, however, is entitled to compensation from a special
fund established by collective agreement between the Confedera-
tion of Swedish Employers (SAF) and the Swedish Confederation
of Trade Unions (LO). The fund is supported by contributions
from employers based on payroll and by contributions from the
state for each day of layoff. The fund, which covers practically all
blue-collar workers, is administered through AMF, a company
established by the parties.73
Severance pay, financed by employer contributions based on
payroll and administered by AMF, is also provided to blue-collar
workers by collective agreement between SAF and LO. The
amount of severance pay is based on age and length of service,
not earnings. It ranges from a minimum of 5,200 Swk ($710) for
72 GINSBURG, supra note 71, at 129-31.
73 Adlercreutz, supra note 57, at 118; Victorin, supra note 62, at 107.
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those who are under age forty, to a maximum of 48,950 Swk
($6,653) for those over age sixty.74
Severance pay for salaried employees is paid from a separate
fund established by collective agreement between SAF and a cartel
of white-collar unions (PTK), again supported by employer contri-
butions based on payroll. The Employment Security Council, creat-
ed by this agreement, funds a variety of programs to aid dislocated
salaried employees. These include subsidies to employees for travel
and moving expenses in taking new jobs; education and training
for new jobs; payment of salary differentials for up to six months
if a new job has a lower salary; training and consultation in start-
ing a business; and grants which cover living costs during the start-
up period.75
The Swedish system, in distributing the burdens of disloca-
tions, has two marked characteristics which distinguish it from
other systems. First, dislocated employees are given much more
help in obtaining new employment than employees in other sys-
tems. The extensive programs for education and retraining enable
employees to qualify for new jobs as technology advances. Compre-
hensive listing of vacancies enables them to find jobs for which
they can qualify, and travel or moving allowances enable them to
relocate to where those jobs are available. Additionally, they can
obtain aid in starting businesses of their own. The Swedish system
emphasizes using every means to get those dislocated workers
reemployed. Second, the major burden of employee protections
and benefits is borne through social funds, not placed on the
particular employer whose employees are dislocated. The employer
must give dislocated employees priority to any vacancies, but the
employer is not required to retain any more employees than need-
ed or to transfer an employee who is less qualified than a person
who would be hired as a new employee. However, any retraining
which may be required is subsidized from social funds. All labor
market programs-education, job training, placement, relocation,
and relief work-are supported either by public funds or private
collective funds provided by employer contributions based on
74 Bj6RKLUND ET AL., supra note 70, at 119-21. A 50 year old worker receives approx-
imately one month's salary in severance pay. But if he is unemployed, seeking work, and
goes through retraining, he may receive an additional amount up to four months' sever-
ance pay. Id.
75 SWEDISH EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATION (SAF)-SALARIED EMPLOYEES IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR (PTK) EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COUNCIL, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY PROGRAMMES FOR
REDUNDANT WHrrE-COLLAR WORKERS 12-19 (1985).
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payroll. Unlike Germany or Britain, severance pay in Sweden is
provided by private social funds, not by the particular employers
who have made the dismissals.
D. Japan 8
Article Twenty-Seven of the Japanese Constitution declares the
right to work a fundamental human right. This has been interpret-
ed as placing on the government an obligation to try to provide
jobs for anyone willing to work.' The law and practice of job
security reflects this social principle.
Protection against dismissal, individual or collective, is not the
product of legislative action, but of judicial decision. Applying the
basic civil law principle of abuse of right, the courts have held
that dismissals without an "objectively and socially reasonable
cause" are legally void and require reinstatement of the dismissed
employees.' Under this standard, individual employees dismissed
for personal reasons receive substantially more protection than
employees under collective agreements in the United States.7
The same general standard applies in collective dismissals for
economic reasons; reduction in the workforce is justified only if
business conditions make dismissal unavoidable. The court, in
deciding whether the dismissals are necessary, will examine the
business situation in detail. Some courts hold that unavoidability
exists only if failure to dismiss will inevitably lead to business fail-
ure. More often, findings that dismissals are not necessary are
based on contradictory actions of management, such as granting
large wage increases, hiring new workers, or paying high divi-
dends.'
If reduction in force is necessary, the employer is obligated to
use every effort to achieve this reduction without dismissing em-
ployees. This includes eliminating overtime, transferring employees
within the enterprise, farming out employees to related companies,
76 See generally TADASHI HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN
152-62 (1985).
77 Id. at 85.
78 Yasuhiko Matsuda, Job Security in Japan, in LABOR MARKET FLExBILrY, supra note
19, at 183, 184; Yasuo Suwa, lexibility and Security in Employment: The Japan Case 5 (1990)
(Working Paper of the Faculty of Applied Economics and Sociology, Hosei Univ., Tokyo).
79 Matsuda, supra note 78, at 184. See also KAzuo SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAw 403
(Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992); Douglas Anthony, Japan, in MANAGING WORKFORCE REDUC-
TION, supra note 42, at 91, 118.
80 SUGENO, supra note 79, at 408.
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soliciting voluntary retirement, laying off temporarily with pay, and
placing employees in a training program." Implicit in these limi-
tations on dismissal is acceptance that workers have a claim to
continued employment and that the enterprise should share the
burdens imposed by economic conditions and technological chang-
es.
These legal rules reflect in large measure the institution of
lifetime employment-a concept which has no explicit legal recog-
nition. While lifetime employment exists in full flower only in
large enterprises of 500 or more employees, its underlying pinci-
ple influences employment practices in many smaller enterpris-
es.8" The legal rules, however, apply to all employment.
Lifetime employment effectively creates two classes of employ-
ees. In large employers, seventy percent or more of the employees
may be classified as "regular" or permanent employees. The rest
may be classified as "temporary," though they may in fact continue
for several years under repeatedly renewed short-term contracts.
Or some employees may be classified as "part time," even though
they regularly work overtime. In addition, employees of subcon-
tractors may perform substantial portions of the work. These
nonregular workers may be accurately described as "buffer em-
ployees" or "shock absorbers." If reduction of the workforce is
unavoidable, these workers are the first ones dismissed. They re-
ceive only limited legal protection.
The lifetime employees who remain enjoy maximum protec-
tion against dismissal. Overtime work is eliminated, and because
substantial overtime is customary, this elimination results in
worksharing among lifetime employees with a reduction in pay.
Employees are transferred to other jobs or placed in education or
training programs. Surplus employees may be farmed out to relat-
ed companies on a temporary basis, retaining their employment
status and salary with any difference in salary made up by their
regular employer. Or they may be moved out, becoming regular
employees of the second employer." Employers do not use tem-
81 Id. at 408-09; JAMEs A. ORR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNITED STATES-JAPAN
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT 26 (1985); Tadashi A. Hanami, Japan,
in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, supra note 22, at 189, 200.
82 Fumito Komiya, Dismissal Procedures and Termination Benefits in Japan, 12 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 151, 152 (1991); Tadashi A. Hanami, Japan, in WORKFORc E REDUCTIONS, supra
note 35, at 167.
83 In a recent nationalization program, Nippon Steel permanently transferred 4,000
employees to subsidiaries and affiliates. Nippon will pay the difference in wages until the
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porary layoffs without pay, but the plant may be closed for weeks
or months with the employees receiving "nonduty pay," which
usually amounts to eighty percent of regular pay."
If all of this is not enough, reductions in the workforce may
be achieved by voluntary retirement, with employees collecting
lump sum severance or retirement pay, which is usually one
month's pay for each year of service.' The employer may solicit
"voluntary" retirement with a "tap on the shoulder" and a friendly
suggestion that the employee should retire. Among the first to be
solicited will be the older workers approaching normal retirement
age. Because salary progresses with age, these are the most costly
employees and are generally considered the least productive. 6
Also, they will be entitled to substantial retirement pay, which will
ease the termination. The employer will also solicit some younger
workers in whom the employer has less invested in training and
who, it is reasoned, have the greatest potential for finding other
employment. Those solicited will be the ones who are least pro-
ductive or who are considered to have the least long term poten-
tial.
These measures are usually sufficient to avoid dismissal of
lifetime employees. After the oil shock in the 1970s, shipbuilding
was reduced by fifty percent, but by using these devices no work-
ers were dismissed outright." During the same period, the steel
industry cut back its production thirty percent. The large compa-
nies accomplished this with no dismissals, but smaller companies
had to resort to some dismissals and early retirement.'
Lifetime employees are dismissed outright only as a last resort.
The employer decides who should be dismissed, usually after con-
sulting the union. The employer must establish objectively reason-
able standards, including job performance, absenteeism, seniority,
and low economic impact on persons below thirty years of age.89
employees retire at age 60. Steelmakers Farm out Workers to Subsidiaries, JAPAN LAB. BuLL.,
Dec. 1994, at 3.
84 For a description of this process, see Anthony, supra note 79, at 110-17; ORR Er
AL, supra note 81, at 26, 37-47.
85 ORR Er AL, supra note 81, at 40-41, 44.
86 MASANORI HASHIMOTO, THE JAPANESE LABOR MARKEr IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE WITH THE UNITED STATES 47 (1990).
87 ORR Er AL, supra note 81, at 86-90.
88 Id. at 90-93.
89 SUGENO, supra note 79, at 409.
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The employer can use the multi-factor test to dismiss many of the
same employees who would be solicited to retire voluntarily.
The lifetime employment system, or what might be better de-
scribed as the practice of avoiding dismissal of regular employees,
is reinforced by government subsidies through the Employment
Stabilization Fund, created to stabilize employment during periods
of business fluctuations and restructuring. If any employer closes
down temporarily, the Fund reimburses the employer for a sub-
stantial portion of the "nonduty pay" for up to seventy-five
days-one-half for employers of more than 300, and two-thirds for
employers of less than 300. The Fund will also reimburse the
employer for educating and training employees and paying them
normal wages during periods of business adjustment.'
Only large employers can make use of all of these measures
for protecting regular employees from dismissal. Small employers
may not have subcontractors who can be terminated or affiliated
firms to take "farmed out" or "moved out" employees. They do,
however, attempt to protect regular employees by using temporary
or part-time employees to the extent possible, and they make
greater use than large employers of subsidies for temporary shut-
downs.
Employees who are dismissed are entitled to unemployment
compensation benefits of sixty to eighty percent of lost wages,
depending on earnings. Benefits continue for 90 to 300 days de-
pending on age and length of employment under the system.
Workers undergoing vocational training may be given an extension
of ninety days and may receive in addition training and lodging
allowances. Unemployment compensation and the Employment
Stabilization Fund are financed by a tax on payroll shared by the
employer and the employees, with subsidies from general taxa-
tion.9
In summary, the burden of worker dislocation in Japan rests
most heavily on the so-called temporary and part-time workers,
who are predominantly women. They are the ones first displaced
and have no recourse except unemployment benefits. Little effort
is made to preserve their jobs, find them other jobs, or otherwise
soften the shock of displacement.92 Lifetime employees bear a
90 HANAMI, supra note 76, at 91.
91 NAGAHISA HIRAISHI, Employment Insurance, in 5 JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SE-
RiES 19, 20-23 (1987).
92 Linda N. Edwards, Equal Employment Opportunity in Japan: A View from the Wes, 41
INDUS. & LAB. REL. RE V. 240 (1988). In part, this is the result of women dropping out
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limited burden when the firm reduces overtime and promotes
"voluntary" retirement, which comes with substantial severance
pay.93 They may be transferred to another location or "farmed
out" to another employer, but bear no loss of earnings or employ-
ment status. All possible measures are taken to avoid their dismiss-
al. As a result, they are seldom dismissed.
While the employer has relatively little burden in dismissing
temporary and part-time employees, the employer has a very heavy
burden in retaining lifetime employees. The employer must at-
tempt to find other jobs for surplus lifetime employees, and if
they are "farmed out" must make up the difference between their
normal pay and their pay on the substitute job. The employer
cannot lay off lifetime employees temporarily, and if the employer
closes down temporarily, it must pay one-half or one-third of the
"no duty pay." In addition, the employer is under heavy social
pressure and moral obligation, as well as legal obligation, to retain
regular employees even though they may not be needed and to
dismiss them only when the cost is too heavy to bear. If dismissal
is unavoidable, the employer must provide a substantial lump sum
severance payment.
The burden borne by social funds is less than that in Sweden,
but more than that in the other countries. Unemployment bene-
fits are quite generous, and they must be paid to the temporary
and part-time workers who have borne the burden of reduced
employment. In addition, the social funds pay one-half to two-
thirds of the "no duty" wages paid during temporary shut-downs
and the same fraction of the regular wages paid employees in
education and training programs during periods of dislocation.
These latter subsidies reduce the employer's burden of maintain-
ing the principle of lifetime employment by making possible tem-
porary shut-downs when there is insufficient work for regular em-
ployees.
E. Summary
The comparison among the five countries as to how the bur-
dens of worker dislocation are distributed between the dislocated
worker, the employer, and social funds, can be summarized in
rather broad terms.
of the labor market for child bearing; they are rarely able to regain regular employment.
93 HANAMI, supra note 76, at 91; Anthony, supra note 79, at 123.
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In the United States, the burden is almost wholly on the
dislocated worker, and almost none is on the employer. The work-
er can be, and commonly is, laid off with little or no notice and
with no severance pay. The employer has full freedom to act,
including temporarily laying off employees when there are only
minor fluctuations in business. Even where there is a collective
agreement, the employer may have no obligation to give dislocat-
ed employees vacant positions or provide any training for vacan-
cies. The United States is the only country in which an employer
can close a plant without consulting the employees' collective
representative and have no obligation to the dislocated employees.
Social funds lighten the employees' burden only with meagre un-
employment compensation benefits, which are the lowest of the
five countries examined, amounting to only half of the benefits in
Sweden and Japan.
For Japanese lifetime employees, the distribution of the bur-
den is the polar opposite of that in the United States. Their in-
come may be reduced by loss of overtime, but they are largely im-
mune from dismissal. The employer must exhaust all possibilities
of avoiding dismissal through the use of transfers, "farming out,"
temporary layoffs with "no duty" pay, and training programs with
full pay. Employers retain unneeded employees even though the
employers are suffering losses. When, as a last resort, lifetime
employees are dismissed, they are paid substantial severance pay.
Temporary and part-time workers, however, have little more pro-
tection than American employees. Finally, in Japan a larger share
of the burden is borne by social funds, with much more substan-
tial unemployment benefits and subsidies for temporary layoffs and
training programs.
In Britain and Germany, the burden is shared between the
displaced employee and the employer. The employee must be
given substantial notice, has a right to transfer to vacant positions,
and, when dismissed, may claim severance pay for redundancy in
Britain and under a social plan in Germany. All of these
protections for employees and the corresponding burdens on
employers are somewhat greater in Germany than in Britain, par-
ticularly under social plans which may be subject to arbitration.
The primary burden on social funds is unemployment compensa-
tion, which is more generous in Germany than in Britain.
In Sweden, the burden of dislocation is shifted heavily from
the particular employer to social funds, both public and private.
The employee is entitled to substantial notice, and the employer
[Vol. 70:5
WORKER DISLOCATION
must attempt to make other work available, and there is limited
severance pay. Public and private social funds provide severance
pay, financial support for relocation and reduction of earnings in
other jobs, aid in starting a business, extensive job training and
education programs, and a variety of other aids toward reemploy-
ment. All of this is undergirded by unemployment benefits, which
replace eighty percent of earnings for up to nearly three years.
II. DISTRIBUTION OF THE EMPLOYEE'S BURDEN
The Japanese system, with its gulf between regular or lifetime
employees and the so-called temporary or part-time employees,
calls our attention to a second level of allocation. To the extent
that the burden of dislocation is placed on the dislocated employ-
ees, who among the workforce bears that burden?
In Japan, the heavy burden of dislocation and unemployment
is placed on those outside the lifetime employment system-the
temporary and part-time employees who serve as a buffer to pro-
tect the job security of lifetime employees. Currently, these are
predominately women, who are largely excluded from lifetime
employment. A second and smaller group consists of those select-
ed by the employer to "voluntarily" retire or who are compelled to
retire-predominately older workers over age fifty.94
In the United States, the burden is distributed among employ-
ees in quite a different way. If there is a collective agreement,
seniority generally controls and the burden falls most heavily on
younger workers. However, in major restructuring, plant reloca-
tions, or plant closings, the burden falls on all those whose opera-
tions are closed down, for there is generally no seniority rights in
other operations or in a relocated plant. In those cases, the
heavier burden is again on the older workers who lose more se-
niority and who will find it more difficult to get other jobs.
94 Those who are retired do not leave the labor market. They normally continue
working, sometimes at the same job, but at substantially less pay and with no job securi-
ty. HASHIMOTO, supra note 86, at 50. Measures to promote employment of middle aged
and older workers include a quota system for hiring older workers and various subsidies
for their employment. HANAMi, supra note 76, at 92; Erin E. Lynch, Late Life Cis.: A
Comparative Analysis of Social Insurance Schemes for Retirees of Japan, Germany and The United
States, 14 COMp. LAB. L.J. 339, 351-353 (1993). Seventy-three percent of firms have pro-
grams for continued employment of retired employees. Seventy-five percent of workers
over 60 remain in the labor force and 56.5% of those over 70. The Employment of Older
Workers in Japan and Policies to Promote It, JAPAN LAB. BULL., Dec. 1994, at 5.
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If there is no collective agreement, the employer decides who
shall go and has the freedom to be completely arbitrary in layoff
decisions, so long as it does not violate laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation against minorities, women, and older workers. In practice,
the general principle of seniority is loosely followed so the pattern
is not significantly different from that under a collective agree-
ment, except that employees who are considered poor workers
may be the first to be laid off.
Swedish law, with statutory seniority, allocates the burden
among employees in much the same way as the American system.
However, statutory seniority can, and often is, varied by collective
agreement, depriving those over fifty-eight of seniority and forcing
them into early retirement. As a result, the heavier burden falls on
the oldest and youngest workers.
In Germany, dismissal is not based strictly on seniority but
also on social considerations, which take into account a variety of
factors including productivity and family responsibilities. The use
of multiple factors with no established weight of relative impor-
tance gives the employer a free hand in selecting those to be
dismissed. With productivity and family responsibilities among the
prescribed factors, the employer, can favor the younger and mid-
dle-aged workers over older workers who are considered less pro-
ductive and who no longer have children to support. The works
council usually does not object to the employer's choice. This
tendency is encouraged by the availability of unemployment bene-
fits for those fifty-eight years of age until they reach early retire-
ment at age sixty.
Superimposed on the rights under the dismissal law are the
benefits of the social plan, with the primary benefit being a lump
sum severance payment ranging from one month to two years'
pay. The amount of the payment is based almost entirely on a
combination of wages, length of service and age (up to age sixty),
and is payable regardless of whether the employee finds another
job. Younger employees, particularly those under age thirty, re-
ceive small benefits, and if they remain unemployed for a substan-
tial period may suffer an economic loss. Employees who are sixty
or over receive nothing, have little chance of finding a job, and
are forced into retirement. The large payments go to the middle
aged employees of long service whose experience makes them
most employable. They may enjoy a net gain.
The British Employment Protection Act provides no standard
for selecting the employees in collective dismissals, leaving the
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employer free to choose so long as the selection is reasonable.
Collective agreements generally provide for last-in-first-out, and
redundancy payments are scaled by age and length of service,
placing the heavier burden on younger employees. Workers of
long service who are able to find other employment and older
workers approaching retirement may, with the combination of
redundancy payments and unemployment benefits, find redundan-
cy attractive. Employers often supplement the payment to obtain
voluntary redundancy of older employees, thereby reducing the
dismissal of younger employees. The end result, however, is that
the burden of involuntary termination falls more heavily on the
younger workers.
Worksharing may significantly change the distribution of the
burden among employees by reducing or avoiding dismissals.
Worksharing takes 9everal forms and may be encouraged or dis-
couraged by payments from social funds. In Japan, worksharing
takes the form of elimination of overtime and reduction of bo-
nuses. Substantial overtime is customary, partly because the small
overtime premium provides little disincentive" and partly because
it deliberately provides "a sort of invisible work force"" which
serves as a cushion for business fluctuations. Bonuses, averaging
about one third of regular pay, 7 provide an additional cushion.
Temporary shutdowns are also used to avoid dismissals and to
distribute the burden equally. The substantial subsidy from social
funds encourages this worksharing method.
In Germany, worksharing takes the form of "short time,"
working less than the normal work week, and is used to a signifi-
cant degree in situations of economic crisis. 8 The government
95 The overtime premium is only one-third, and overtime payments are not included
in calculating the semi-annual bonus. Where the bonus amounts to one-third of regular
pay, the pay for overtime hours is the same as for a regular bonus. Where the bonus is
greater, as it often is, overtime hours cost less than regular hours.
96 Suwa, supra note 78, at 32.
97 Kazutoshi Koshiro, Bonus Payments and Wage Flexibility in Japan, in LABOR MARKET
FLEXIBILITY, supra note 19, at 45, 49-50; HASHIMOTO, supra note 86, at 84.
98 ABRAHAt & HOUSEMAN, supra note 52, at 86-91; Weiss, supra note 41, at 146-47.
The 1994 metal working agreement allows works councils to reduce work to 30 hours as
an alternative to redundancies. This has avoided an estimated 50,000 redundancies.
Worksharing for 500,000 Engineering Employees, EUR. INDUS. REL REv., Oct. 1994, at 6. Coal
mining adopted a four-day week to save 10,000 jobs. Four-Day Week to be Introduced in
Mining Company, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Jan. 1994, at 8. The steel industry instituted a' 35
hour week to save jobs. 35 Hour Week Brought Forward in Stee EUR. INDUS. REL REV., May
1994, at 6. As of the end of 1992, prior to the institution of these short times, 500,000
workers were on short times.
19951
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
encourages this worksharing method by paying unemployment
benefits in proportion to the short time. In Sweden, temporary
layoffs are prohibited, and the employer must pay full wages or
dismiss the employee. However, employers may institute short
time, pay the employees full pay, and obtain reimbursement for a
limited time in an amount equal to unemployment benefits.
The United States has no consistent pattern. Unemployment
compensation laws in some states discourage reduced work
weeks.' For example, employees who earn any money on four
days during the week may be denied benefits for that week. Addi-
tionally, employees earning more than a certain amount receive
reduced benefits. Other states provide pro rata benefits for short
work weeks. Unions almost uniformly oppose worksharing, even
when employees receive pro rata unemployment benefits.1" Se-
nior workers claim that their seniority entitles them to all of the
available work. In nonunion establishments, the practice varies
with some using short work weeks while others do not.
III. IMPLICIT SOCIAL VALUES
The preceding discussion has mapped out the differences in
the way these five countries distribute the burden of worker dislo-
cation. We now come to the elusive question of why these differ-
ences exist. The distribution of these burdens is largely a matter
of social choice. To answer the question "why," we must search
out the implicit social values which underlie or are expressed by
the different choices. This can give us a better understanding of
the other societies, but also a deeper insight into the values of our
own society. These values are seldom explicit, are often deeply
buried, and may not be entirely consistent in their complexity. We
may easily misunderstand the values implicit in another society of
which we have limited knowledge and less experience. We may
also misperceive the implicit values in our own society because our
closeness dulls our awareness and distorts our view. To obtain the
full value of comparison, however, requires that we try; the follow-
ing are tentative conclusions drawn from the descriptions present-
ed.
99 As of 1992, only 17 states provided for short-time compensation. SAUL J.
BLAUSTEIN, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 336 (1993).
100 ABRAHAM & HOUSEMAN, supra note 52, at 134-39.
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A. The Right in a job
The statement that employees have "property rights" in their
jobs simply expresses the reality that society places such value on a
worker's security in his job that it will protect him from being de-
prived of it unnecessarily.
American law denies the existence of any property right in a
job; under employment at will, an employee may be deprived of
her job without notice and without cause. Labor is a commodity,
and the worker is simply a seller of that commodity, hour by
hour, day by day, with no right to continued employment. Recent
judicial incursions in this doctrine betray dissatisfaction and signal
an effort by some judges to find a legally protected interest, but
employment at will remains the dominant doctrine in the law.
American ambivalence toward this social value is apparent
from the nearly universal presence in collective agreements of
protection against unjust discharge and seniority provisions, which
give employees a vested interest in their jobs. In the collective bar-
gaining sector, this is viewed as more than a property right, but as
a right to industrial life, with discharge being characterized by
workers as "capital punishment." Collective bargaining, however,
covers only one-eighth of the private sector; employers, even those
who have collective agreements, vigorously oppose any legal pro-
tection, and proposed legislation lacks effective political support.
The value of workers being secure in their jobs is recognized
in all of the other countries discussed. For example, the German
dismissal statute proceeds from the premise that an employee has
a legal right to continued employment and that the employer can
dismiss only on a showing of "social justification." In Britain, prior
to 1970, employment was at will, subject only to reasonable notice.
This was so repugnant to the workers' sense of justice that strikes
were regularly used to assert job rights. The Employment Protec-
tion Act sought to meet this problem by legally protecting the
workers' right not to be unfairly dismissed, thereby ratifying the
workers' view of property rights in a job. Even Japanese temporary
workers are protected from unreasonable dismissal. A property
right in a job is implicit in the right of a redundant employee to
transfer to a vacant position in the enterprise, even though that
may require training and readjustment of job duties. This right is
recognized in various forms in each of the other three countries.
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It does not exist in American law and has only limited recognition
in collective agreements.
Severance pay is also an implicit recognition of a property
right in a job. Under German social plans, severance pay is scaled
to the length of service, and the employee is entitled to the full
amount even though she has another job waiting and suffers no
loss of earnings. The rationalization is that the severance payments
compensate for being separated from the job and that this prop-
erty right becomes more valuable with longer service. British re-
dundancy payment and Japanese severance or retirement pay are
also scaled to the length of service, not loss of earnings-implicitly
treating the job as a property right of increasing value. Because
the right to continued employment is socially valued, the employ-
ee is entitled to pay for severance from the job. Again, this value
gets scant recognition in the United States, even under collective
agreements.
B. The Right to Work
Sweden goes beyond mere protection of the right to continue
in a present job; it views the right to work, the right to be a pro-
ductive member of society, as an affirmative social right. The artic-
ulate social policy is to avoid the psychological and social costs of
workers not having productive work."1 Severance pay is not used
to compensate dislocated employees for loss of their jobs. Rather,
resources are directed primarily toward getting workers reem-
ployed. Large amounts of social funds support extensive education
and training programs for the unemployed, services enabling them
to locate and qualify for new jobs, loans to help them start their
own businesses, and relocation subsidies to enable them to move
to new jobs. "Relief work," or public service jobs, is provided for
those entering the labor market or otherwise unable to find other
jobs. Paying unemployment benefits for not working is a last re-
sort. Sweden spends two and a half percent of its GNP on its
labor market policies-more than any other country and ten times
that spent by the United States.
101 "As one Swedish official has observed, 'Swedes are not particularly religious, but
one thing we do hold almost sacred is everybody's right to work.' . . . But full employ-
ment is not viewed solely in economic terms .... The goal is to enable everyone to
live as a normal a life as possible and 'to reduce the risk of isolation, loneliness and
alienation.' Work is considered the key to a normal life. In short, a job is considered a
basic right." GINSBURG, supra note 71, at 122-23.
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The Japanese Constitution declares the right to work as a
fundamental human right. This has been interpreted as placing on
the government an affirmative obligation to provide jobs for any-
one willing to work. This principle stated constitutionally, however,
seems to have played little explicit role in shaping Japanese social
policy, perhaps because the low rate of unemployment has en-
abled dislocated employees to find other work. Germany places
emphasis on job training for dislocated workers, though substan-
tially less emphasis than Sweden. The motivation, however, seems
to be primarily economic, such as alleviating the wage loss, reduc-
ing the costs of unemployment benefits, and increasing produc-
tion, rather than the importance of work for the fulfillment of the
individual.
In the United States, social policy focuses almost entirely on
providing the dislocated worker with minimal financial support
until she can find another job. Job training programs, though nu-
merous, are transitory and provide training for only a small frag-
ment of the unemployed. The emphasis has been heavily on those
seeking to enter the labor market, with nearly no attention to
those displaced by technological or economic developments. 2
The focus has been on the individual's obligation to find work,
not on society's obligation to provide work. The right to have
work has no effective recognition as a social value in the United
States.
C. Employer's Right to Control
In the United States the employment at will doctrine gives the
employer unbounded right to control the employment relation-
ship. In the area of job security, the law has placed few limits on
this right other than prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, creed, nationality, sex, age, and disability. The employer is
free to reduce the workforce and decide who shall be dismissed.
The employer can displace one worker with another, dismissing
those working and hiring new employees from the street: The em-
ployer can dismiss employees while requiring others to work over-
time. The employer can restructure the workforce, eliminate de-
partments, and close or relocate plants. Collective agreements,
102 See generally Robert H. Haveman & Daniel H. Saks, Transatlantic Lessons for Em-
ployment and Training Polity, 24 INDUS. REL 20 (1985); David A. Cohen, Labor Market
Policy in Sweden and the United States: The Cooperative State vs. Enduring Notions of Capitalism,
15 CoMP. LAB. LJ. 55 (1993).
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where they exist, place significant limits on employer control.
However, some decisions, like plant closures, are legally protected
management prerogatives. Employer control is the dominant social
value in the area of job security in the United States.
Employment at will doctrine is in sharp contrast to established
principles in each of the other countries where it has been explic-
itly rejected. In those countries, employers cannot dismiss without
just cause, hire from the street while dismissing employees poten-
tially qualified to do the work, or dismiss employees while others
work overtime. In Britain, Germany, and Sweden, employers are
not limited in deciding what operations to conduct or how many
employees are needed, but they are limited in dismissing employ-
ees when work is available and in selecting who can be dismissed
if that dismissal is unavoidable. In Japan, and to a lesser extent in
Germany and Sweden, the court may inquire into whether the
dismissals are economically necessary. Employer control is a limit-
ed social value, overridden by the employee's right in the job.
D. Employer's Social Responsibility
Closely related to the employer's right to control is the ques-
tion to what extent the employer has a social responsibility for its
employees. At one end of the spectrum is the American view,
legally expressed in the employment at will doctrine. Law treats
labor as a commodity traded on the market with no continuing
obligations of the employer to its employees. The employer has no
substantial legal obligation beyond providing a safe place to work
and paying for the work performed. Collective agreements do not
significantly change this relationship because employment remains
an arms' length transaction. To be sure, many American employ-
ers recognize some social responsibility toward their employees,
but the law provides no protection from the competitive pressure
of those who assume no social responsibility. The dominant opera-
tive value is that employers bear no social responsibility for their
employees.
At the other end of the spectrum is the Japanese employers'
sense of compelling obligation to its permanent employees. It pro-
vides various buffers which will protect permanent employees' jobs
and keep them on the payroll even though they may not all be
needed. Lifetime employees are not viewed as sellers of labor, but
as full members of the enterprises for whom the employer has a
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lifetime responsibility."3 Employment is a symbiotic relationship
with all employees members of the "family."1 The Japanese sys-
tem, however, embraces contradictory values when dealing with
subcontractors, temporary and part-time employees. They are not
considered members of the family and are used and discarded by
the employer to provide job security for lifetime employees. To-
ward them, the employer owes little or no responsibility.
The German social plan reflects a clear contrast to the Amer-
ican view. The social plan imposes major responsibility on employ-
ers for displaced employees. In addition to severance pay, the
employer is legally obligated to offer displaced employees other
jobs available anywhere in the enterprise and may be required to
train them for available jobs, help pay the costs of relocation, and,
for a period, compensate for the difference in earnings which may
result. Employer responsibility for its employees stems from the
social conception embedded in German labor law, not unlike that
in Japan, that employees are not sellers of labor but members of
the enterprise to whom the enterprise has continuing responsibili-
ty.
Swedish legal provisions impose limited obligations on employ-
ers to cushion the blows of dislocation. There is no legally re-
quired severance pay but only a requirement that the employer
give the employee an opportunity to take any other available job
in the enterprise. However, Swedish employers have assumed other
responsibilities for displaced employees through security funds
created by agreement with the unions and supported by employer
contributions. These funds acknowledge the collective responsibili-
ty of employers for their displaced employees, distributing the
costs among the employers rather than leaving it on the particular
employers and employees where the dislocation occurs.
E. Fairness
Employment at will in the United States denies that employers
have any obligation of fairness. In the classic judicial statement, an
employer may dismiss an employee "for good cause, for no cause,
or even for cause morally wrong." Other countries explicitly reject
103 See, e.g., Tadashi Hanami, Security of Employment in Japanese Labor Law, 15 INDlUS.
LJ. 461, 462 (1992) ("both parties to the employment contract regard their relationship
as something more than a mere exchange of wage and labour, it is viewed as a long
term personal relationship").
104 HASHIMOTO, supra note 86, at 68.
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the basic American rule. This does not mean that American em-
ployers lack any sense of moral obligation to be fair to their em-
ployees, but the great majority insist on the right to be unfair.
The failure to repudiate this view, either by legislation or by ac-
ceptance of collective bargaining, betrays the fact that the United
States puts a higher social value on employer prerogatives than on
employees' right to fairness. The other countries show a reverse
priority of social values.
Under collective agreements in the United States and general-
ly in the other four countries, individual dismissals are subjected
to the test of fairness. Except in the United Kingdom, the concep-
tion of fairness is substantially the same. The English test is not
based on objective fairness to the employee, but on the good faith
and subjective fairness of the employer. The focus is not on what
the employee in fact did, but on what the employer reasonably
believed she did. The social value given priority is the law's fair-
ness to the employer, not the employer's fairness to the employee.
In collective dismissals, the different distribution among em-
ployees of the burden of dislocation reflects quite different views
of fairness. The seniority principle, basing priority rights to jobs
on length of service, is considered fair in the United States in
both union and nonunion settings; it is legally controlling in Swe-
den and is given substantial weight in Britain and Germany. How-
ever, it may be an equivocal principle under some collective bar-
gaining agreements in the United States, for seniority units may
not be employer-wide. For example, a senior employee in one job,
department, or plant may be laid off while a junior employee in
another job, department, or plant continues working in the collec-
tive bargaining setting. Seniority seems less a principle of funda-
mental fairness than an objective standard easily applied and not
subject to arbitrary application.
In Germany, use of strict seniority would be considered un-
fair. Other factors such as age, family responsibility, ability to find
other work, and productivity must be taken into account. Such
multiple considerations may appeal to our sense of fairness, but in
practice they permit manipulation by the employer with compli-
ance by the works council, leading to concealed favoritism and
arbitrary results. However, most Germans apparently consider the
use of multiple considerations fair.
The Japanese do not seem to consider unfair the two class
system which gives lifetime employees job security at the expense
of temporary employees. Nor do they consider unfair the
[Vol. 70:5
WORKER DISLOCATION
employers' practice of selecting lifetime employees for "voluntary"
retirement or dismissal based on the employers' untested judge-
ment as to productivity or future usefulness. Although the Japa-
nese constitution prohibits discrimination- on the basis of sex, the
Japanese deny lifetime employment to women who are temporarily
out of the labor market because of child bearing or child rearing.
The Japanese do not consider this practice unfair.
The treatment of older workers marks the biggest difference
in what is considered unfair. In the -United States, the seniority
system tends to give older workers priority even though their pro-
ductivity has declined. In addition, federal law prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of age for workers over forty years of age, and
there is no mandatory retirement age. In contrast, Japanese life-
time employees are mandatorily retired between ages fifty-five or
sixty. If dismissal of lifetime employees becomes necessary, those
over the age of fifty or even forty-five are among the first to go.
The rationale is that the older workers are more expensive, gener-
ally less productive, and that room must be made for promotion
of younger workers.
Both Germany and Sweden use early retirement, encouraged
by payments from social funds, of workers over the age of fifty-
eight to distribute the burden of dislocation. Exceptional concern
for older workers in the United States is underlined by the fact
that we are the only country which prohibits mandatory retire-
ment. Reduction of the retirement age and use of early retirement
are motivated in Germany and Sweden primarily by a concern for
younger workers. The objective is to remove older workers from
the labor market so as to keep younger workers on the job and to
make room for youths to enter the job market."5 In the United
States, the value of providing work for younger workers takes sec-
ond place to the value of allowing older workers to continue in
their jobs.
F. Worker Solidarity
Worksharing as a method of distributing the burden of dislo-
cation is not regularly used in the United States. Unions generally
oppose it because it violates the seniority principle. The union
view is that the pain of lack of work should not be shared equally
105 See generally Harold L. Wilensky, Nothing Fails Like Success: The Evaluation-Research
Industy and Labor Market Policy, 24 INDUS. REL 1 (1985).
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by the employees; the senior employee should work full time and
the junior employee should be relegated to unemployment bene-
fits. This lack of solidarity extends to senior employees working
overtime when junior employees are laid off.
In Germany, short time is a customary method of adjusting to
production cutbacks, and in Japan worksharing is used to the
extent of eliminating customary overtime and in temporary shut-
downs. In Sweden, worksharing can be used for a limited period
but seldom is, apparently because unemployment benefits pay
eighty percent of wages so there is less incentive to share the avail-
able work. In both Germany and Sweden, overtime is limited to
distribute available work."6
The appeal to solidarity carries little weight with most Ameri-
can workers who have a job. They consider their jobs as belonging
to them with no obligation to share with those facing unemploy-
ment. Unions reflect the same individualism; proposals to legally
limit overtime to reduce unemployment-a common practice in
other countries-are dismissed out of hand by most American
unions and American workers. In contrast, German unions have
recently negotiated reduced work weeks with no increase in pay in
order to provide jobs for the unemployed.
G. Public Responsibility for Displaced Workers
Perhaps the most significant comparison of social values is the
extent to which the different countries distribute the burdens of
worker dislocation broadly through society with public funds. Are
the costs of dislocation a social responsibility or the responsibility
of the workers and employers directly affected?
It is painfully evident that in the United States the public
assumes a smaller portion of the burden of displacement than in
any of the other countries studied. The only substantial burden on
public funds is unemployment compensation, and these benefits
are a smaller portion of lost wages than in any of the other coun-
tries. Unemployment benefits in the United States are only forty
106 In Germany overtime is allowed only to the extent of two hours a day on 30
days in the year. See WEiss, supra note 35, at 67. In Sweden, overtime over 40 hours a
week is permitted only in cases of special need and is limited to 48 hours in four succes-
sive weeks, for a total of 200 hours overtime each year. Adlercreutz, supra note 57, at 83.
In Sweden, unions have urged their members not to work legally allowed overtime so as
to help reduce unemployment. Sweden: Labor Market on Overtime, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV.,
May 1994, at 10. This view is shared by many German unions and work councils.
Sengenberger, supra note 35, at 84-85.
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percent of lost wages, payable generally for only six months. This
compares with roughly sixty percent in Britain for one year, with
sixty-five to seventy percent in Japan for periods of eighteen to
sixty weeks, with sixty-eight percent in Germany for one year to
thirty-two months, and with seventy-five percent for sixty to ninety
weeks in Sweden. In addition, public funds in Japan pay one-half
or two-thirds of the wages lost to employees due to temporary
shutdowns or to being loaned to other employers. In Sweden,
employers tax themselves to provide severance pay and aid to
dislocated workers. The United States spends only .18% of its GNP
on labor market measures such as job training, job placement and
worker relocation. This compares with 2.4% of GNP spent by
Sweden and substantial amounts spent by Germany and Japan."7
In addition, Britain, Germany, and Japan have used public funds
to help reduce or slow down the closing of major plants or indus-
tries so job loss could be absorbed by attrition or so employees
could have a longer time to make adjustments.
The underlying premise in the United States is nearly total
reliance on the market, leaving the losses from business fluctua-
tions, industrial changes, and technological development where
they fall, with only minimal protection of workers from wage loss.
The underlying premise in the United States has been baldly stat-
ed, "[elmployment security has traditionally not been viewed as
associated with a public purpose."' ° The dominant social value is
individualism, which is characterized as:
[T]he belief that the citizen should be free to pursue his or
her own self interest so long as that pursuit does not unlawful-
ly prevent others from doing the same. Coupled with this val-
ue, is a belief in self-reliance (i.e., that an individual should
rely on his or her own efforts to make a living and achieve
status in society). Society, in turn, has only minimal responsibil-
ity for the well-being of the individual."°
In employment, this means nearly total reliance on the mar-
ket, unchanneled by social control."' In contrast, the underlying
premise in Sweden is that worker dislocation is a social responsibil-
107 See Wilensky. supra note 105, at 1, 7, 17.
108 Block, supra note 19, at 128.
109 Id. at 129.
110 "There is a general consensus in the United States that the market is the most
efficient, and therefore the preferred, mechanism for allocating economic resources." Id.
at 130.
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ity and that the burden should not be left entirely on those work-
ers directly affected. There is recognition that changes in the
market, the introduction of new products, and technological de-
velopments inevitably dislocate workers from their existing jobs
and require them to find new jobs. Workers have no control over
these changes and little ability to foresee or to provide for them.
Employers are also often helpless victims. The fruits of these
changes are shared by the whole of society; the burdens, there-
fore, should be shared by the whole of society. Sweden recognizes
a dual social responsibility: to distribute the burdens which the
market imposes with financial support for dislocated workers, and
to help workers to adjust to changing labor market needs with
education, job training, job search assistance, and relocation. Ger-
many and Japan, to a lesser extent, accept this social responsibility.
CONCLUSION
0 wad some Pow'r the girie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!
It wad frae monie a blunder free us
An'foolish notion .... 111
Comparative labor law studies can enable us to see beyond
the legal rules, institutions, and practices and recognize some of
the underlying social values which motivate various societies. We
can become more sharply aware that values which one society
accepts without reflection as natural or inevitable are not shared
by other societies. We are forced to recognize that social values
which we have become persuaded are economically efficient or
essential in our system have been rejected in other systems which
are economically viable or even perform more effectively than our
own. This forces us to acknowledge that our values are not im-
posed upon us, but are chosen by us, either thoughtlessly or delib-
erately.
If we can see ourselves as others see us, the new perspective
should challenge us to question whether the values our legal rules
and practices express, but our words and minds suppress, are the
values we would consciously choose. It might from many a foolish
notion free us.
111 Robert Bums, To a Louse, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE
(M.H. Abrams ed., 6th ed. 1993)(1786).
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The study here is only of one small segment of our labor law,
perhaps no larger than the louse Bums saw on the churchgoer's
neck. But it may be equally revealing of much more about us. The
study does give us a mirror to see ourselves and some reflection of
the fundamental social values we practice though not confess. We
see our values expressed in the employment relation-more accu-
rately described in nineteenth century terms as "master and ser-
vant." We see ourselves in comparative terms how others must see
us. We see the low level of employer responsibility for the employ-
ees who produce the goods and the services of the enterprise. We
confront our foreshortened sense of social responsibility for the
hardships suffered by workers as a by-product of economic change
and industrial development, the fruits of which we all share. We
might then seriously consider in what direction our moral obli-
gations should move us.
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